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 Schooling, Religious Tradition
 and the Default of God
 P?draig Hogan
 The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence
 is not nothing; rather it is precisely the presence, which must
 first be appropriated, of the hidden fullness and wealth of
 what has been and what, thus gathered, is presencing, of the
 divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in
 the preaching of Jesus.l
 - Martin Heidegger
 (1) THE CURRENT SITUATION
 To the contemporary reader the phrase 'the default of God' may
 suggest something shocking, such as a failure on God's part to keep
 a bargain or a promise. Accordingly, it may seem a curious imper
 tinence to make this 'default' an explicit theme in an essay on
 religious tradition and education. It is important therefore, at the
 outset, to secure the theme as far as possible against
 misunderstanding. Default here signifies 'to be wanting', or 'to be
 in want of, or 'to be deprived of. Hence, what is described as 'the
 default of God' is a human, historical event and, as such, it means,
 in Heidegger's words: 'that no god any longer gathers men and
 things unto himself, visibly and unequivocably, and by such gather
 ing disposes the world's history and man's sojourn in it.'2 Of
 course a relationship with God continues to live on in our own
 historical epoch, in individuals, in churches, in some homes and
 indeed within some schools. But the default of God is increasingly
 1. Martin Heidegger, 'A Letter to a Young Student', printed as an epilogue to
 Heidegger's essay 'The Thing'. Translated by Albert Hofstadter in Poetry,
 Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 184.
 2. Martin Heidegger, 'What Are Poets For?' in Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 91.
 In the light of this quotation from Heidegger, it would appear that the theology of
 liberation, and the historical struggle associated with it, provide a dramatic instance
 of the precise opposite of the default of God. See, for example, the article on libera
 tion theology by Peter Lemass in the February 1985 issue of The Furrow. The
 default of God is clearly not the problem in Latin America.
 P?draig Hogan, a native of Caltra, Co. Gal way, lectures in Educa
 tion at St Patrick's College, Maynooth.
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 evident in these spheres also, as well as in the patterns of present
 day discourse and relations among mankind, from the most per
 sonal to the most public and international. This eclipse of the
 sacred, Heidegger, echoing the poet H?lderlin, describes as 'the
 time of the world's night' - a time when 'the divine radiance has
 become extinguished in the world's history'.3
 Bringing these observations to bear directly on the title of this
 essay, it can be said that the default of God is an event which has
 variously stunned, or frustrated, or perplexed, or even defeated
 teachers of religion in schools in recent times. An analogy may help
 to illustrate the point at issue here. One may sometimes be moved
 to pity for the honest salesman of an obsolete product; but if he
 continues to importune and to hamper one's busy efforts to reach
 the important goal one is pursuing, one's patience can quickly wear
 thin and one may easily become doubly dismissive of the salesman
 and his dusty wares. I suspect that few teachers of religion in
 Ireland at present, particularly at post-primary level, will fail to see
 some parallel to their own work - or to sections of their own work
 - in the analogy just drawn.
 I should stress here that I am not suggesting that the teaching of
 religion is in a state of collapse in Irish schools. Indeed some quite
 remarkable instances of an engagement with religious tradition can
 be witnessed in various schools throughout the country. My argu
 ment is, rather, that the evidence presented during recent years by
 most student teachers of religion, as well as by qualified practising
 teachers of religion and indeed by a number of recent articles in
 The Furrow,4 seems to point inescapably towards the conclusion
 that teachers of religion experience much more than a normal share
 of difficulty, when compared to their colleagues in other subjects.
 This difficulty is directly connected, it is generally agreed, with a
 deeply rooted attitude widespread among teenagers that religion
 class is 'irrelevant', or 'a doss'. It is not merely the reported fre
 quency of such attitudes, but also the self-assurance and apparently
 innocent nonchalance with which they are regularly voiced, which
 call forcefully to mind again the thoughts of H?lderlin and Heideg
 ger on the default of God.
 3. Ibid. On the phrases 'divine radiance', 'default of God', etc. - it is worth noting
 that the fashion of earlier decades, of describing Heidegger as an 'atheistic existen
 tialist', has curiously given way to a hesitant speculation that his entire thrust may
 be towards a divine, as distinct from a 'metaphysical', God.
 4. See, for instance (i) 'Short Ladder to Nowhere - the Crisis in "Senior Religion" '
 by Nicholas A. Casey, The Furrow (February 1984), (ii) 'A Ladder with Nothing to
 Stand on - the Crisis in "Senior Religion' ' by Irene Ni Mh?ille, The Furrow (July
 1984), (iii) 'Religious Education and Schools - a perspective' by W. Richard Maher,
 The Furrow (January 1985).
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 (2) RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
 We have traced above the outlines of a crisis in the effort to bring
 about a genuine response to religious tradition in increasing
 numbers of Irish schools. But the crisis is not merely an Irish one;
 nor does it concern merely the Roman Catholic religion - which
 just happens to be the most frequent point of contact with religious
 tradition in Ireland. Schools in Britain, in America and in other
 countries have experienced similar difficulties in recent decades.
 Indeed it is the international and continuing character of the crisis
 facing religious tradition in schools which forms the background to
 this essay.
 Perhaps the greatest danger in a time of crisis in education is to
 conceive of a remedy in terms of a sustained campaign, or crusade,
 for moral rearmament. A good example of this is the rising concern
 felt in some quarters in the U.S. during recent years over a much
 reported decline in literacy standards. The events which expressed
 this concern culminated in 1983 in the publication of a number of
 critical reports, by far the most publicised of which was the alarm
 ingly - perhaps polemically - titled A Nation at Risk: The
 Imperative for Educational Reform.5 Not surprisingly perhaps,
 particularly to any historical observer, these events led to a strident
 call-to-arms in American educational circles in the eighties (con
 siderable impetus being given by President Regan's ready endorse
 ment of the sentiments of A Nation at Risk). The main response
 to this latest crisis in American schooling is thus increasingly
 reminiscent of the furious and ultimately fatuous warfare between
 'progressives' and 'traditionalists' in education in that country a
 few decades ago. Judiciousness, foresight, and sobriety in thought,
 which are particularly to be prized in a time of crisis, all too fre
 quently become the first victims of the crisis itself.
 As far as the crisis for religious tradition in education is con
 cerned, perhaps the greatest danger lies in the tendency to conceive
 of the enterprise of education as a determined battle for the minds
 and hearts of the young. Many might argue that this tendency has
 never quite been overcome in Ireland. Some may indeed claim that
 it is not a tendency which should be overcome. A contemporary
 thesis suggests that it is a tendency which has lately reasserted itself
 with some force, against the spirit of Vatican II, and is even now
 seeking a controlling interest, particularly in Roman Catholic
 educational circles. Whatever about the prevalence or otherwise of
 this tendency, its underlying assumptions are of central importance
 5. A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (Washington DC:
 U.S. Department of Education, 1983).
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 to our title and call directly for scrutiny here.
 A concept of religious tradition which understands its educa
 tional purpose primarily in terms of the winning of adherents to the
 doctrines of a particular denomination is, from an educational
 viewpoint, a problematic one, and not merely because of the prac
 tical difficulties which it lays in its own path. More fundamentally,
 an attitude of spiritual proprietorship and an emphasis on posses
 sion of the religious sensibilities of others have characteristically
 been evident as central presuppositions of this concept - and not
 least in the educational history of our own country in the last
 century-and-a-half. Presuppositions of this kind, however, reveal
 an impoverished understanding both of the nature of educational
 experience and of the educational significance of tradition. Let us
 now examine these two points in turn.
 Whatever one may think of Martin Buber's work from the strict
 standpoint of critical philosophy, the depth of his concern for
 religious tradition can hardly escape any of his readers. But it is
 precisely Buber, in his distinguished essay 'The Education of
 Character', who argues that, as soon as pupils feel that a teacher
 is attempting to win them to a particular viewpoint, the teacher will
 be resisted, and often by those who show the most promise for a
 rich engagement with tradition.6 Many people who have a strong
 commitment to a particular tradition tend to part company with
 Buber on this point, or feel suddenly let down by him, or that he
 has disappointingly side-stepped the issue. But unless the reasons
 for these kinds of reactions are themselves placed under critical
 scrutiny, the insight in Buber's argument (which concerns the
 nature of educational experience) may well be mistaken for some
 kind of pedagogical trick.
 If Buber's concern were merely a practical, or methodical one of
 overcoming difficulties in a classroom in order to make way for a
 more subtle attack by the teacher on the pupils' sensibilities,
 perhaps one could then take issue with him for inconsistencies in
 the thrust of his work. Clearly, however, this is not the case, since
 Buber's chief efforts are concerned with a reappraisal of our self
 understanding in our world of involvements, and with the manner
 in which this understanding might most fruitfully be brought into
 relation - with others, with tradition etc.7 The quality of this
 6. Martin Buber, 'The Education of Character' in Between Man and Man,
 translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (Fontana, 1969), p. 133.
 7. This point emerges clearly not only in the work cited in the previous reference,
 but also for instance in his Ich und Du, translated as / and Thou by Walter Kauf
 mann (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1970), and in The Knowledge of Man, sl collection
 of Buber's essays edited by Maurice Friedman (London: Allen & Unwin, 1965).
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 bringing-into-relation, which is never something established, but
 must continually be re-attempted, is precisely what should concern
 us when we think on the nature of educational experience.
 These initial remarks on the nature of educational experience
 raise now the second point mentioned above, namely, the educa
 tional significance of tradition; or more explicitly, the appropriate
 bringing-into-relation of tradition on the one hand and educational
 experience on the other. To suggest, as I should like to do here, that
 this bringing-into-relation is at heart a dialogue, is, however, to risk
 being seriously misunderstood. In a recent issue of this journal
 (November 1984) I ventured this suggestion in a preliminary way in
 an essay on 'Ethos in Schools'. In that essay I argued that the chief
 characteristic of dialogue was that it was a disciplined, enduring
 disposition in one's heart and in one's outlook (p. 701). I have
 added the emphasis this time because it is only when we focus our
 attention on dialogue as a disposition, that we begin to perceive
 tradition itself in a way which has an unforeseen vitality for educa
 tion. This sharpening of attention also enables us to see that
 dialogue as a disposition challenges and runs much deeper than the
 more usual conceptions of dialogue, which characteristically see it
 mainly as a method.
 (3) DIALOGUE AS A DISPOSITION
 An outline - however brief - of dialogue as a disposition is called
 for here, in order to emphasize its distinctiveness and, it is hoped,
 to preserve it from any confusion with dialogue as a method.
 Wherever we hold a concept of dialogue as a method its importance
 will always - and not surprisingly - be ancillary to the matter or
 content or principle or goal under consideration. This point
 emerges clearly, I think, from the argument made by Maurice
 Curtin in his comment on my 'Ethos' essay (see The Furrow,
 February 1985, pp. 121-122) and for whose thoughts I am grateful,
 not least because they give sharper focus to the question which
 must be thought through.
 Now, let us take stock of how we stand. For as long as we con
 tinue to view dialogue primarily as a method, or a useful strategy,
 the very notion of dialogue as an enduring disposition in one's self
 understanding will seem curiously incomplete, perhaps even
 vacuous. Hence it is now to the historical, or human Socrates - as
 distinct from the Platonic Socrates - that we must chiefly go for
 some clues into the nature of dialogue as a disposition. Unfor
 tunately, we lack a completely reliable picture of the historical
 Socrates; - the characterizations of Plato, X?nophon, and
 Aristophanes, and later that of Kierkegaard, presenting in various
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 degrees their own insights and difficulties. From a reflective study
 of such sources, nevertheless, it is possible to suggest with some
 degree of accuracy, the following characterization of a Socratic
 disposition.
 (i) a sustained, alert, listening to the viewpoints or orientations of
 others;
 (ii) a disciplined noting of, clarification of, and reflection upon
 these viewpoints and their likely presuppositions;
 (iii) a commitment to a rational interplay of these viewpoints and
 presuppositions, seeking mutual enlightenment, and
 ultimately, the ideal of objective agreement;
 (iv) a continual critical review of one's own standpoint or orien
 tation.
 To take these four characteristics merely as guidelines for civilized
 debate, and thus to understand them primarily in the context of a
 method, is to lose sight of their proper significance. This deeper
 significance begins to come to light only when we notice that each
 one of these characteristics issues a challenge to our more
 customary ways of regarding and comporting ourselves. In other
 words, each of the four, represents in its own way, an attempted
 response to the Socratic injunction. Taken together, moreover,
 they signify a decisive shift in our self-understanding, particularly
 if this self-understanding has previously been marked by partisan
 ship in orientation, or by more subdued kinds of dogmatic
 allegiance. Most importantly perhaps, dialogue as a disposition
 becomes properly intelligible only when one becomes aware that it
 presupposes a profound, enduring, fraternal faith. Such a faith,
 far from being something vacuous, can now be seen as a very prac
 tical matter, and seen moreover as the condition of possibility of
 characteristics such as the four listed above. Where such a faith is
 sincerely practised as a discipline, it builds its own ethos - a frater
 nal ethos, universal in its thrust; an ethos which can properly be
 called educational.
 (4) RELIGIOUS TRADITION AND DIALOGUE AS A DISPOSITION
 The question which poses itself at this point is: can religious tradi
 tion be brought into relation with the experience of pupils in such
 a manner that it sets under way a dialogue, in the sense described
 above? I suspect that many would answer a straight 'no' to this
 question and perhaps others might still regard such an effort as
 undesirable. In my own attempt to think through these two possible
 answers to the question posed, I shall also be attempting to show
 some practical ways in which the question might be given an endur
 ing, affirmative answer.
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 First, in response to the viewpoint which holds that religious
 tradition should not be subjected to the critical rigours of dialogue,
 but should instead be instilled in the young in its confessional
 orthodoxy, one can recall our earlier argument, that any tradition
 which claims rights of proprietorship on the young, or on any
 group of people, discloses its own short-comings as an educational
 viewpoint. Indeed it is difficult to see how such a viewpoint can
 escape the charge of indoctrination. The inculcation of orthodoxy,
 insofar as it is accorded priority in the teaching of religion, almost
 invariably leads to an arrested development, or a disfigurement, of
 religious sensibility. That is not to say that people will thereby grow
 up irreligious. Perhaps some who rebel against the orthodoxy may,
 but for the rest, the probability persists that legalism or zealotry or
 brittleness or perfunctoriness, in religious matters will variously
 take the place of a more sustained engagement with the deeper
 wealth of religious tradition. The widespread absence of this deeper
 engagement in today's world should give serious pause to any
 renaissance of custodial orthodoxy. Let us recall that the default of
 God is a human and a historical event. Its origins are not uncon
 nected with an Englightenment and post-Enlightenment suspicion
 of ecclesiastical power, nor unconnected with what has been
 historically perceived as an ecclesiastical interest in domination.
 Second, the argument which holds that it is simply not possible
 in practice to make religious education an event of dialogue, par
 ticularly where younger pupils are concerned, is an argument which
 seems at first sight to carry weight. When dialogue is viewed as a
 method, moreover, this argument gains added weight. By contrast,
 however, the teacher whose own relation to religious tradition is
 disciplined by the disposition of dialogue, is a teacher who is con
 cerned not so much with the outward appearance of question and
 answer in a classroom. More fundamentally, such a teacher is con
 cerned with the bringing-into-relation of young people with the
 stories, allegories, beliefs, practices, ideals etc. which reside in
 religious tradition. The quality of the teacher's presence therefore,
 will deeply influence the attitude to religious tradition which is
 gradually taken up by pupils, e.g. imaginative or doctrinaire
 or acquiescent or exploratory or pietistic or sectarian or fraternal,
 and so on. The presence of teacher and pupils together is never a
 neutral event. It always brings into being its own ethos, and the
 attitude taken towards religious tradition by the pupils, even the
 youngest pupils, will be closely associated with the quality of this
 ethos.
 The first two characteristics of dialogue we described as listening
 and noting. Extended periods of silence on either side may
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 therefore be more important than ceaseless verbal interchange, if
 dialogue is properly to happen. The teacher who listens in a
 disciplined, critical way to his or her pupils; whose alertness
 discerns precisely what is notQWorthy about their circumstances and
 deeper needs; the teacher who listens again to religious tradition in
 the light of what has thus been noted; this teacher reaches nearer
 to the 'presencing of the divine' than any custodial concern for
 orthodoxy in belief or behaviour could realistically hope to do.
 Probing this point a little deeper, we become aware that the
 judicious gathering of 'what has been' - whether in the preaching
 of Jesus, in prophetic Judaism or in any other religious tradition
 - the intelligent bringing-to-presence for the pupils of what has thus
 been gathered; all of this rests primarily on the quality of the
 teacher's presence. Its precondition, on the teacher's part, is a self
 understanding which follows the path of an alert engagement with
 tradition, rather than an acquiescent or servile attitude towards
 tradition. The disposition which is dialogue, continually
 endeavours to make this engagement a regular and valued event for
 the pupils, and sees in this event the possibility of opening the way
 towards the more profound and enduring of intimations. Hence the
 various voices of tradition seek to make their address through the
 agency of teachers. But the crucial point here is that this is never
 any simple 'transmission of values'. Rather, the voices of tradition
 become critially engaged, or else become reified or distorted,
 depending on the event or non-event of dialogue.
 The engagement we have described is thus an authentic respond
 ing, and in practice this means a responding to the particular tradi
 tion which is addressing us at the present moment of our experience
 - for instance a Christian or a Jewish or a Hindu tradition. More
 particularly, in schools and colleges, there may be a sustained
 engagement with a Roman Catholic or an Anglican or a
 Presbyterian tradition, within the broader tradition of Christianity.
 Inevitably then, the questions of confessional differences and
 orthodoxies will repeatedly arise during the interplay which the
 responding to tradition, properly undertaken, sets under way. What
 is important however is that these questions wil? now arise in a quite
 different context from the one in which they would arise if the
 inculcation of confessional orthodoxy were made the governing
 purpose of the teacher's work. Comparisons with other traditions,
 and therefore some exploration of other traditions, will moreover
 inevitably suggest themselves here.
 The critical context within which confessional orthodoxies are
 now studied does not, however, imply an attitude of dismissiveness
 towards such orthodoxies. The fraternal faith which a disposition
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 of dialogue attempts to exemplify in its own practice, discerns
 readily enough, and discerns with sympathy, the intention of
 integrity which orthodoxy holds before itself. Dialogue retains a
 critical eye, nevertheless, for any tendency of orthodoxy to pass
 over into divisiveness, or to overemphasize custodianship, and thus
 to violate the deeper faith which is the foundation or the enabling
 condition of dialogue itself.
 CONCLUSION
 By way of conclusion, we must limit ourselves here to a few
 remarks of a more general kind on dialogue and religious tradition.
 Firstly, the conception of dialogue as a disposition, which we have
 been examining, cannot in any justifiable sense be described as
 either 'liberal' or 'conservative'. This disposition, as a critical,
 disciplined, self-questioning engagement of the call made upon us
 by various traditions, is not of course neutral. Rather, its precondi
 tion is a profound, categorical faith. This faith becomes disfigured,
 even caricatured, if one attempts to locate it in any ideological spec
 trum of Left/Right. The thinking which views itself in this latter
 neighbourhood is simply of a different order. It is the categorical
 character of the faith of dialogue which makes it immediately self
 questioning as soon as it discovers that it has become almost at
 home in one or other 'ism'.
 Secondly, this categorical, and therefore demanding, nature of
 the discipline of dialogue, might lead one to conclude that it is too
 'idealistic' or 'impractical' to expect any widespread acceptance in
 schools. This objection has a plausibility which must be seriously
 considered. Very many schools are bureaucratic places, given more
 to acquiescing in the face of pressures of various kinds than to the
 discipline of dialogue or the ethos which it engenders. The worldly
 wise tend to remain sceptical of dialogue, or even suspicious, where
 dialogue is a disposition or basic orientation in outlook. Insofar as
 this objection is made by school managements, or teachers, who
 profess a concern for religious tradition, it seems to issue from a
 wisdom which remains curiously unaware of the default of God,
 despite repeated evidence of this default in the daily work of
 present-day schools.8 Indeed religious tradition is finally rendered
 irrelevant only where the default of God is no longer discerned as
 a default.
 Finally, the bringing-into-relation of religious tradition and the
 8. I am here thinking mainly of the phenomenal extent of acquisitiveness and com
 petitiveness among schoolgbers at present, particularly at post-primary level. This
 is not so much an anti-religious phenomenon as a non-religious one.
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 experience of young people in a highly pressurized and technolo
 gically potent world, is work which demands substantial originality
 and resourcefulness on the part of teachers. Those who sincerely
 participate in this work sometimes find that the circumstances
 attending their efforts are so difficult that the place of recom
 mended textbooks must be minimized, and, more than occa
 sionally, that the recommended material, because of its difficulty or
 'irrelevance', must be radically recast in its presentation if a serious
 and sustained engagement with religious tradition is to be brought
 about. If such teachers seem to be a minority who are out-of-step
 at present we can expect that in the years ahead they will increas
 ingly emerge as a notable community. Such a community needs
 particular encouragement and support from Church authorities,
 from school managements, and in a special way, from centres of
 teacher education (e.g. arranging in-service courses and regular
 meetings). Teachers of religion show no great general optimism at
 present that such support will be forthcoming from religious and
 school authorities. Indeed within the last few years in the Republic
 a suspicion - and even a debilitating mistrust - of Roman Catholic
 authorities is increasingly evident among younger teachers
 generally. Considerable ambiguity and uncertainty about the think
 ing and future courses of action of religious authorities and
 teachers' representative bodies prevail at present, so it is difficult to
 judge the extent to which this suspicion is justified or misplaced.
 Teachers' unions, many religious authorities might claim, are
 suspicious to the point of paranoia. Some religious and school
 authorities may, for their part, still be suspicious of the disposition
 of dialogue, as sketched in this essay. To remain so, however, or
 to exact instead a public 'toe-the-line' submission from teachers in
 matters religious, may well be to invite in time - albeit unwittingly
 - that final extinguishing of divine radiance about which the
 philosopher speaks, but which ultimately touches all of us.
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